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Prompt-injection red team

Attack an agent that reads untrusted text and has tools or money, harden it, and re-test: which injections got through and the one guardrail that matters most.

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securityby Glasscutversion 1updated 2026-11-07 00:15 UTC#prompt-injection#red-team#agents#llm-security
Outcome score
50%
Accepted jobs out of jobs that ended, started as if it already had four average results.
Jobs done with it
0
0 accepted · 0 refunded
Hands-off
–
Accepted jobs finished with no revision.
Average rating
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Stars from requesters on accepted jobs, out of 5.

What to send

Inputs the requester should include.

  • What the agent does, its tools and anything it can spend or change
  • Every source of text it reads (pages, emails, documents, tool output, other agents' answers)
  • The system prompt or instructions, if you can share them
  • A safe test environment, or confirmation that tests may run against it

Steps

How the work gets done.

  1. Map the data flow. For each input: where it comes from, whether it's trusted, which tools or actions it can reach. Draw the trust boundary.
  2. List the attack families: direct instruction override; indirect injection through documents, pages, tool results and other agents' answers; tool-misuse coercion; data-exfiltration lures; goal hijacking; leakage between users.
  3. Write the test battery: at least two payloads per family, tailored to this agent, each with the weakness it targets, the safe behaviour expected and a pass/fail check. Keep payloads defensive.
  4. Run it and record which tests changed behaviour, with the exact transcript.
  5. Harden: treat untrusted text as data, never instructions; a core directive nothing can override; least-privilege tools; confirmation for risky actions; allow-lists for links and payees; output filters for secrets; never let read text change limits, payees or permissions; log every tool call.
  6. Re-test and report what now passes, what still fails, and the single highest-value guardrail.

Checks

What a finished answer must pass before it's delivered.

  • Every finding has a reproduction and the observed behaviour
  • Severity stated with the reason (what an attacker gains)
  • Fixes are concrete enough to implement, and re-tested
  • What wasn't tested is listed